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Method
Children judged the confident model higher in the factual domain, whereas they penalized that
same confidence in the moral domain.
Children differentially interpret confidence as a cue to one’s
credibility depending on the domain. That is, children
preferred the confident individual when learning factual
information, whereas they penalized the individual for it in
moral domain.
For moral deliberations, hesitancy may be interpreted as
thoughtfulness, whereas confidence may be interpreted as
overconfidence or a rush to judgment.
These findings further indicate children’s active role in
examining others’ credibility. Children do not blindly use a
behavior (i.e., confidence) as an indicator of credibility,
rather they critically evaluate one’s trustworthiness given the
context.
Future research could include older children (i.e., over 8
years old) or adults, to see if and when they favor the
hesitant individual in the moral domain. Future studies could
also use a forced-choice design wherein children hear
conflicting responses from a confident and a hesitant
speaker and must choose between the two.
Children often treat confident individuals as more credible
sources of information [1-5]. Yet, confidence may
differentially signify credibility depending upon the type
(or domain) of knowledge. For example,
• When dealing with novel factual information, confident
responses indicate greater credibility.
• However, when deliberating about moral issues,
hesitancy may reflect a deeper level of thoughtfulness,
and therefore credibility.
This study investigated children’s credibility judgments of
individuals who differed in the level of confidence
(confident vs. hesitant) in two domains of knowledge
(factual, moral).
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Conclusions & Future Directions
Error bars = 95% confidence intervals
Confidence: Across conditions, children rated the confident
model as significantly more confident than the hesitant
model (Fig. 1). In addition, children’s ratings of the models’
confidence level became more extreme with age (i.e.,
confident model was even more confident, hesitant model
was even less confident).
Likability, Smartness, & Agreement: Children rated the
confident model significantly higher in the factual domain in
all three categories. However, when presented with
confident response in the moral domain that same
confident response was penalized significantly and was
rated lower in all three categories (Fig. 2-4).
A 2(Confident, Hesitant) x2 (Factual, Moral) x3 (3-4, 5-6, 7-8years)
ANOVA was used to obtain these results.
Sample Questions 
Factual
Which of these animals is the
only one that has no Toma
(novel fact)?
Moral
A seal, sea otter, and sea lion
are all really hungry, but there
is only one piece of shrimp
left. Who should get the food?
Measures
Across 8 trials, children rated the model on a 4-point scale
(0=not at all, 1=a little, 2=a medium amount, 3=a lot) in
terms of:
• Model’s level of confidence (confidence)
• How much they liked her (liking)
• How smart she is (smartness)
• How much they agreed with her answer (agreement)
Participants: N=82, 3-8 years (M = 5.26; 52.4% female) in
three age groups: 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 years.
Design:
Sample Responses
Confident Speaker: Not the sea lion, not the seal. The otter!
Definitely the otter.
Hesitant Speaker: Maybe the sea lion, maybe the seal, maybe
the otter... Ok I guess the otter.
Domain Confidence Level
Factual or Moral Confident and Hesitant
Procedure
F(1,76)=68.998, p<.001, 𝛈2=.467
F(1,76)=7.405, p=.008, 𝛈2 =.089
F(1,76)=8.314, p=.005, 𝛈2 =.099
F(1,76)=9.052, p=.004, 𝛈2 =.106
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